Omnipotence

Introduction

Omnipotence has, from the beginnings of monotheism, been considered one of the incommunicable attributes of God, usually accompanied by other attributes – Omnipresence and Omniscience.

The vernacular definition of the term itself ascribes it as the ability to do all things, which in more analytic terms might be formulated as "X is Omnipotent iff, should X will a certain state-of-affairs Y, Y cannot possibly fail to be obtained." From this definition, there obviously follow a host of potential difficulties in maintaining the coherence of the concept. The classical omnipotence paradox, of note, rears its head: "Can an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that they can't lift it?"

The other angle of Omnipotence, set apart from the "functional" aspect described above, is the angle of maximal power; of being fundamentally unable to be surpassed, on pain of logical contradiction. Although obviously related to the above formulation of the concept, this aspect can be seen as dealing with the very grounding of it. That is to say: It is desirable to provide a mechanism that logically explains and justifies claims of boundless power. This page seeks to provide an overview of both facets of Omnipotence, as well as a guide for how the concept is used in this community.

NOTE: Although the intent of this article is to provide a broad analysis and presentation of the concept as a whole, those who are looking for an immediate guide to Tier 0 can refer to Sections 4.1 and 4.3, as well as the ones that follow them.

Etymology

Omnipotence derives from Latin, and means "All Power," or "All Potency". Omnipotent, being derived from this word, would have meant near to "Almighty" or "That can do all".

• Omni - from the Latin: omnis | meaning: every, all
• Potence
  • from the Latin: potentia | meaning: power, potence
  • from the Latin: potens | meaning: power, potence

The Functionality of Omnipotence

Modalities

Two extremely important concepts in logic are those of Necessity and Contingency. In short: Something is necessary if it could not fail to be the case, and otherwise is contingent. With regards to logical propositions, these concepts can be exemplified in the following forms, or "modalities," the object of study of modal logic:

• Necessarily true propositions (e.g. "All unmarried men are unmarried")

• Necessarily false propositions (e.g. "John is shorter than Mary and Mary is shorter than John")

• Contingent propositions, neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. (e.g. "All apples are red")

Something is deemed to fall within the realm of possibility if it does not violate a given set of conditions. In this context, the conditions in question are often taken to be the laws of logic. As such, both necessarily true statements and contingent statements fall under the umbrella of possibility. Indeed, the laws of logic themselves fall within this scope, inasmuch as they are consistent with themselves. Necessarily false statements (e.g. Contradictions), thus, are simply impossible.

In contemporary philosophy and logic, these concepts are often framed using the idea of "possible worlds." In spite of the provocative name, "possible worlds" are primarily simply abstract states-of-affairs that are internally consistent and not necessarily any kind of cosmological concept.

In technical language, a "world" is defined as nothing but "A maximal, consistent set of propositions." To understand what this means: Picture the collection of all possible propositions. All conceivable sentences expressing a state-of-affairs. Then assign values of "True" and "False" to each of them, to your leisure and taking care to remain consistent. The result obtained after all of them have been assigned truth-values is a possible world. A possible world where only a single electron exists is simply a collection of propositions where only the proposition "There exists an electron" has been assigned as true, while all others (Save, perhaps, the ones revolving around this electron) have been deemed false.

Instances of possible worlds in logic can be found in things as simple as truth-tables. In the following, for example, "p, q, r" are the raw propositions, and each of the 8 combinations of truth and falsity listed below them is a possible world:

In that context, the concepts of possibility, impossibility, necessity and contingency are thus framed as:

• A proposition is possible if there is at least one possible world in which it is true
• A proposition is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds
• A proposition is necessarily false if it is false in all possible worlds
• A proposition is contingent if it is true in some possible worlds, and false in others.

Note, therefore, the broad scope that a "possible world" is allowed to take: A possible world is not a single universe (If, by "universe," what is meant is "A single spacetime continuum"), as, clearly, "There exists an infinite number of spacetime continuums" is a consistent proposition that can be assigned as true or false, and therefore constitutes a single possible world.

Indeed, the notion of "possibility" that is meant here is logical possibility: Whether a proposition complies with the laws of a given logical framework. If these laws, as above, are simply the three laws of thought, then this makes logical space quite vast: Any state-of-affairs that does not entail self-contradiction would constitute valid material for a possible world.

Contrast that with, for example, nomological possibility, which is possibility constrained to the laws of nature and the conditions of the physical world. A multiverse of branching timelines would be restricted to this type of possibility, as the "possible universes" in it would consist only of timelines that can possibly obtain given a certain arrangement of physical states. Likewise, it is impossible for a human to levitate under the laws of physics, and therefore this is an act which falls outside of nomological possibility. However, as there is no logical contradiction in the idea of a levitating person, it nevertheless remains in the realm of logical possibility.

"Logical" Omnipotence

Building off on the above: The most defended position on this topic, in contemporary philosophy and theology, is to say that the causal power entailed by omnipotence does not extend to logical absurdities and contradictions. Proponents of this view argue that, just as contradictions cannot be a part of reality, they cannot be seen as entities of any kind – they are literally nothing, neither potential nor actual.

As such, an omnipotent being could not create a round square, or a four-sided triangle, or a married bachelor, not because of any limitation of its power, but because these things are simply pseudo-tasks without any object underlying them. A contradictory proposition, as it were, does not actually express any object X such that the omnipotent fails to be capable of creating X. Therefore, no actual weakness is imparted on it from that fact.

The writer Clives Staples Lewis, mostly known for his work on The Chronicles of Narnia, is often cited as a modern thinker who propounded this view. In his book, The Problem of Pain, he explains it the following way:

His Omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to his power. If you choose to say 'God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it,' you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the two other words 'God can.'... It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of his creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because his power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God. —The Problem of Pain

However, the argument itself far predates him. Augustine of Hippo had already gone on record as saying that God is incapable of doing some things precisely because of his omnipotence. Put simply, God cannot do anything that would contradict his nature as maximal existence, which includes things such as dying, falling into error, and so on and so forth.

For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God should live forever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error,—for this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. —The City of God

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, writing over a century later, outlines the same position in saying that God's omnipotence entails an inability to "fall away from himself," as he is the paradigm of all existence and truth, and to deny himself would be to fall away from those, and into weakness.

Yet Elymas, the Magician, says, "if Almighty God is All-powerful, how is He said by your theologian, not to be able to do some thing "? But he calumniates the Divine Paul, who said, "that Almighty God is not able to deny Himself." Now in advancing this, I very much fear lest I should incur ridicule for folly, as undertaking to pull down frail houses, built upon the sand by little boys at play; and as being eager to aim at the theological intelligence of this, as if it were some inaccessible mark. For, the denial of Himself, is a falling from truth, but the truth is an existent, and the falling from the truth is a falling from the existent. If, then, the truth is an existent, and the denial of the truth a falling from the existent, Almighty God cannot fall from the existent, and non-existence is not; as any one might say, the powerless is not powerful; and ignorance, by privation, does not know —The Divine Names

Come the 13th Century, Italian friar, philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas wrote a lengthy exposition on the arguments outlined above as part of his seminal work, the Summa Theologiæ. As he explains it:

It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey. It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. —The Summa Theologica I, Q. XXV: The power of God, Art. 3. Objection 4

A potential objection to the above view is that it seems to make an omnipotent being ultimately restricted and conditioned by something external to itself (Namely, the laws of logic), thus invalidating its claim to omnipotence in the first place. The objection itself can be met with three possible answers:

1) Denying that the laws of logic are actually-existing abstract objects to begin with. As they don't truly exist, in this view, they cannot "bind" anything, either.

2) Affirming that an omnipotent being provides the grounding for logic to begin with. Under this view, the laws of logic themselves are simply how our discursive intellect breaks down and recapitulates the omnipotent's nature as the basis and condition of reality. A more detailed exposition on this will be found later in this section.

The third answer, meanwhile, is...

Universal Possibilism, Modal Voluntarism and Dialetheism

In contrast to the above position, this view of Omnipotence holds that an omnipotent agent could indeed violate the laws of logic and accomplish contradictory and absurd tasks. God could, for instance, create a married bachelor, or a four-sided triangle, or create a stone so heavy that he is unable to lift it, and then proceed to lift it anyway. For perhaps self-explanatory reasons, this form of Omnipotence has found comparatively little defense.

Perhaps the most well-known proponent of this stance is none other than René Descartes, who infamously held to a view that eventually came to be known as "modal voluntarism": God's free act of creation originates even the eternal and immutable truths of logic and mathematics. As the cause of such truths, therefore, God could simply have done otherwise than to create them, and is as such capable of freely enacting logical absurdities, not being limited by what he has made.

Descartes' position, sometimes also dubbed "universal possibilism," is widely held to be untenable in contemporary philosophy. However, something akin to it (Though focusing more on the nature of God's own existence, rather than its causal powers) has been advocated for in modern times, in the work of István Aranyosi – Advocating for a position which he dubs "logical pantheism," Aranyosi suggests that God is best conceived of as being the totality of "Logical Space." Logical Space, as he expounds it, is the maximally inclusive region in which all conceivable propositions and their negations exist; not simply the collection of all possible worlds, but also containing even contradictory claims about possible worlds.

For example: Philosopher David Lewis scandalously posited the thesis of Modal realism, where possible worlds are seen as actually-existing, concrete realities that are just as real as our own world, arguing that these alternative worlds are the truthmakers for modal claims. Others, meanwhile, see possible worlds as being abstract objects, not actually concrete as our own world is, and others then see them as simply useful fictions, which we mentally construct in order to formalize statements in modal logic. For Aranyosi, all three of these positions would exist as separate "logical spaces" (uncapitalized) within the all-encompassing Logical Space (capitalized). All conceivable oppositions, including nestings thereof, are contained as parallels within Logical Space, as he puts it:

As was apparent when discussing, in Chapter 1, the way to account for the conflict between certain philosophical positions that disagree about logical space itself, our notion of Logical Space has both a horizontal dimension and a vertical one. By vertical dimension I mean the fact that Logical Space is nested, that is, it contains levels that represent mutually exclusive canonical logical spaces at lower or more basic levels. The disagreement between compatibilism and incompatibilism is a disagreement about logical space, but Logical Space is nested so that it is able to represent this disagreement by representing two disjunct, that is, mutually exclusive regions, side by side. So at this higher level Logical Space contains both a compatibilist canonical logical space and an incompatibilist one as subregions. Similarly, consider the canonical logical space consisting of a partition distinguishing two mutually exclusive subregions, P and ¬P. This space does not contain a region where (P & ¬P) is the case. However, there is a view, dialetheism, according to which some contradictory statements are true, or that some contradictions are true at some worlds. At a higher level, therefore, Logical Space will represent both the classical and the dialetheist space side by side. This higher level is nested in that it contains lower level canonical logical spaces. —God, Mind, and Logical Space

The (Supra-)Ontology of Omnipotence

The Ground of Being

Having surveyed the positive, or active, aspect of Omnipotence, it falls on us now to examine the negative, or passive, aspect of the concept. As outlined prior: Not simply Omnipotence as "the ability to do all things," but as the concept of maximal existence and unsurpassable power. Although it is common to think of both concepts as walking hand-in-hand, or even as being synonymous with one another, the latter is not necessarily reducible to the former.

Contemporary philosophy (At least as regards Western thought) often refers the concept of maximal being, or perfect being, back to the Christian philosopher and monk Anselm of Canterbury, who in his most well-known work, the Proslogion, characterized God as "That than which no greater can be thought." That is: If there is a being that can have something greater than it, it is not God. From there, springs what is perhaps something close to the layman's conception of an omnipotent being: A person with power of an unassailable nature, including, often, also all "great-making" properties, which Anselm defined as "That which is better to have, than to not have," all likewise in forms that are beyond any and all creatures.

Different viewpoints on what exactly such a characterization entails have emerged throughout the history of theology. Brian Davies characterizes one such viewpoint by the name of "theistic personalism," a self-admitedly broad brush which, in general terms, is defined by its proponents' method of outlining God while taking, as a reference point, the outline of the human person itself.

To be clear, theistic personalism as defined above generally does not actually hold to a conception of Deity that involves corporeity and other such limitations of the human condition. Far from picturing God as a bearded man in the sky, it, on such accounts, simply views God as a being whose existence consists of greatly magnified forms of attributes found in creatures, excluding thus the limitations of corporeality but not necessarily things such as temporality.

The usual contrast made against theistic personalism, in turn, is classical theism, which according to the proponents of the distinction posits God as something radically different from all creatures, with a host of attributes that so-called theistic personalists often reject: Timelessness, Immutability, Impassibility, Simplicity, etcetera.

Though the usefulness and applicability of the label of "theistic personalism" itself has been contested before, the picture that it paints can be compared to what philosopher Barry Miller has referred to as "Perfect-Being Theology," defined thus as the position that God holds all "great-making properties" simply in their highest possible degrees, with these predicates otherwise existing in God in the same way that they exist in creatures. William Vallicella marks a similar distinction by characterizing a dispute consisting of two opposing sides: That God is "a being among beings" and that God is "Being itself."

Regardless of opinions on the identity or lack thereof of such delineations, a bird's eye account of the relevant sides of the issue can be formulated as follows: Is there any reality that embraces both the omnipotent and the non-omnipotent? Or is the omnipotent so utterly transcendent over creatures that there can be no common term encapsulating them both as members of itself? Despite a modern tendency to adopt the former, philosophers over the ages have often found themselves drawn towards the latter option. 20th Century theologian Paul Tillich formulates it concisely in his characterization of Deity as the "Ground of Being." Given as follows:

"The being of God," he says, "is being-itself. The being of God cannot be understood as the existence of a being alongside others or above others. If God is a being, he is subject to the categories of finitude, especially to space and substance. Even if he is called the “highest being” in the sense of the “most perfect” and the “most powerful” being, this situation is not changed. When applied to God, superlatives become diminutives. They place him on the level of other beings while elevating him above all of them. Many theologians who have used the term “highest being” have known better. Actually they have described the highest as the absolute, as that which is on a level qualitatively different from the level of any being-even the highest being. Whenever infinite or unconditional power and meaning are attributed to the highest being, it has ceased to be a being and has be-come being-itself."

He continues thus: "As being-itself God is beyond the contrast of essential and existential being. We have spoken of the transition of being into existence, which involves the possibility that being will contradict and lose itself. This transition is excluded from being-itself, for being-itself does not participate in nonbeing. In this it stands in contrast to every being. As classical theology has emphasized, God is beyond essence and existence. Logically, being-itself is “before,” “prior to,” the split which characterizes finite being."

In short, therefore, to identify the Omnipotent as the "ground of being" is to say that the Absolute, though the source and ultimate generator of all features of creaturely existence, is in truth beyond any and all such features, not contained nor appropriately described by any of the categories which define created things. One of the oldest recorded instances of this approach to divinity is to be found in the works of Plotinus (204/5–270 A.D), the earliest of the Neoplatonists, wherein he expounded on the supreme principle of his system, "The One."

Anything existing after The First must necessarily arise from that First, whether immediately or as tracing back to it through intervenients; there must be an order of secondaries and tertiaries, in which any second is to be referred to The First, any third to the second. Standing before all things, there must exist a Simplex, differing from all its sequel, self-gathered not inter-blended with the forms that rise from it, and yet able in some mode of its own to be present to those others: it must be authentically a unity, not merely something elaborated into unity and so in reality no more than unity's counterfeit; it will debar all telling and knowing except that it may be described as transcending Being- for if there were nothing outside all alliance and compromise, nothing authentically one, there would be no Source. Untouched by multiplicity, it will be wholly self-sufficing, an absolute First, whereas any not-first demands its earlier, and any non-simplex needs the simplicities within itself as the very foundations of its composite existence. There can be only one such being: if there were another, the two [as indiscernible] would resolve into one, for we are not dealing with two corporal entities. Our One-First is not a body: a body is not simplex and, as a thing of process cannot be a First, the Source cannot be a thing of generation: only a principle outside of body, and utterly untouched by multiplicity, could be The First. Any unity, then, later than The First must be no longer simplex; it can be no more than a unity in diversity. Whence must such a sequent arise? It must be an offspring of The First; for suppose it the product of chance, that First ceases to be the Principle of All. —The Six Enneads, V.4.1

For the mainstream reading of the Neoplatonic traditions, the absolute principle is beyond all multiplicity and distinction, and thus beyond all demarcations that differentiate beings from each other. As these demarcations are precisely what mark out, specify and define beings as beings, the One, as their transcendent source, is deemed to be "beyond being," inasmuch as it is not "a" being, standing "somewhere else" apart from all others. It is, rather, the most basic condition which anything whatsoever must meet in order to exist, not reducible to any of its products nor exhausted by them. As Dr. Eric Perl puts it:

Thus Plotinus argues that since to be is to be one, determinate, and therefore dependent, the One, as the enabling condition for beings, cannot itself be another being, one of the beings. “It is not intellect [i.e. The One], but prior to intellect; for intellect is something of beings, but that is not something, but prior to each thing, nor is it a being; for being has as it were a shape of being, but that has no shape, even intelligible shape. For since the nature of the One is generative of all things, it is none of them. If the One were any being, or were something, it could not be “generative” of all beings. The One cannot be included within the totality of that-which-is as any member of it, even the ‘first’ or ‘highest,’ precisely because the One is that in virtue of which there is such a totality at all. Thus the common expression ‘supreme being’ would be, for Plotinus, a contradiction in terms: no being can be supreme, because to be a being is to be something, to be one determinate 'this,’ and therefore to be not supreme but dependent. No being can be the first principle, and the first principle cannot be any being. —Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition

In deploying the analogy of light Plotinus repeatedly uses the expression ‘by which’ to articulate the distinction between all that can be known and the One as the enabling condition of knowability. The distinction between illuminated things and light itself thus represents not the ‘ontic’ difference of one being from another, nor even the ‘metaphysical’ difference of one level of reality from another, but rather the difference between any and all levels of being, and the One as the condition for any degree of intelligibility and hence of being. The passage from any and all beings to the One is thus comparable to the passage from illuminated and therefore visible things to light itself as the condition by which they are visible. It is not a turning from one set of objects to another object apart from these, but rather a shift of attention, within the apprehension of beings, from the intelligible beings themselves to the condition of intelligibility and being. —Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition

The One thus “encompasses all things” or, more precisely, is the “encompassment of all things," that is, not another thing but the undifferentiated containment of all things. The ‘ascent’ from beings to the One, therefore, is not a turning from one ‘world,’ one set of objects, to another, but is rather an in-gathering, an apprehension of the same content in ever greater concentration. Because intelligibility and being depends on determination and therefore on differentiation, when we attain absolute concentration, surpassing all differentiation whatsoever, we pass beyond thinking, beyond intellectual apprehension, and hence beyond being. —Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition

The One of Plotinus, therefore, transcends the distinction between any and all levels of reality (Transcends even the intelligibles, the Platonic Forms) as an undifferentiated totality, or, more correctly, as the "undifferentiation" of all things. And all things are beneath it, are beings, insofar as they are simply objects that meet the condition for existence, and not the condition itself. This fundamental condition, then, is unity, or "one"ness.

It is in virtue of unity that beings are beings. This is equally true of things whose existence is primal and of all that are in any degree to be numbered among beings. What could exist at all except as one thing? Deprived of unity, a thing ceases to be what it is called: no army unless as a unity: a chorus, a flock, must be one thing. Even house and ship demand unity, one house, one ship; unity gone, neither remains thus even continuous magnitudes could not exist without an inherent unity; break them apart and their very being is altered in the measure of the breach of unity. Take plant and animal; the material form stands a unity; fallen from that into a litter of fragments, the things have lost their being; what was is no longer there; it is replaced by quite other things- as many others, precisely, as possess unity. —The Six Enneads, VI.9.1

In sum: Any given thing exists insofar as it is has internal unity, if it is "one," and if it were to cease to be one, it would lose its being. The One, as such, is not really a "unified being" so much as the paradigm of unity per se, transcending all particular content and therefore virtually containing all content in itself.

The above considerations- to which others, doubtless, might be added- suffice to show that these five are primary genera. But that they are the only primary genera, that there are no others, how can we be confident of this? Why do we not add unity to them? Quantity? Quality? Relation, and all else included by our various forerunners? As for unity: If the term is to mean a unity in which nothing else is present, neither Soul nor Intellect nor anything else, this can be predicated of nothing, and therefore cannot be a genus. If it denotes the unity present in Being, in which case we predicate Being of unity, this unity is not primal. Besides, unity, containing no differences, cannot produce species, and not producing species, cannot be a genus. You cannot so much as divide unity: to divide it would be to make it many. Unity, aspiring to be a genus, becomes a plurality and annuls itself. Again, you must add to it to divide it into species; for there can be no differentiae in unity as there are in Substance. The mind accepts differences of Being, but differences within unity there cannot be. Every differentia introduces a duality destroying the unity; for the addition of any one thing always does. —The Six Enneads, VI.2.9

This very notion, in turn, springs from the sixth book of Plato's Republic, which features a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, where the former expounds on the central idea of the work – The Good, which he describes as that which is over and above the Forms in the Intelligible Realm. Indeed, while the Forms are essences ("Ousia," the "what"ness of all things), the Good "transcends essence."

“An inconceivable beauty you speak of,” he said, “if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely cannot mean that it is pleasure.” “Hush,” said I, “but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.” “How?” “The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.” “Of course not.” “In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge [The Forms] not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.” —The Republic, Book VI

This, of course, being a way to underscore the transcendence of the first principle by placing it above any delimitations or specifying features; not "This thing, and not another," but all things virtually contained in a totality without any borders or qualifications.

This emphasis on the supreme principle as going above and beyond all determinations, all contracting characterizations, also finds itself being propounded in many schools of Eastern thought. The 8th Century Indian philosopher Adi Śaṅkara posited the concept of Brahman as the nondual, distinctionless ground of existence, which is nothing other than pure existence, qualified by nothing. Perhaps in a way scandalous to more analytic sensibilities, Śaṅkara thus holds Brahman as "nirguṇa," or "without attributes."

Of course, Śaṅkara's own conception of Brahman instantly and immediately parts ways with the Western conceptions of the Absolute outlined above insofar as his system adheres to a radically monistic view of reality, in which the world of distinctions, divisions and differentiations is held to be an illusion (maya, माया), and Brahman is in turn the sole existent. Whereas the Neoplatonic traditions and its inheritors saw the absolute transcendence of the One, or God, as precisely the reason for its being absolutely distinct from all things, Śaṅkara considered the world to be "dream-like," only perceived as something other than Brahman due to delusion. As he himself puts it:

1. I am the supreme Brahman which is pure consciousness, always clearly manifest, unborn, one only, imperishable, unattached and all-pervading like the ether and non-dual. I am, therefore, ever-free. Aum. 2. Pure and changeless consciousness I am by nature devoid of objects (to illumine). Unborn and established, in the Self I am all-pervading Brahman in the front, oblique, upward, downward and all other directions. 3. I am unborn, deathless, devoid of old age, immortal, self-effulgent, all-pervading and non-dual. Perfectly pure, having neither cause nor effect and contented with the one Bliss I am free. 4. No perception whatever in waking, dream or deep sleep belongs to Me but it is due to delusion. For these states have no independent existence nor an existence depending on the Self. I am, therefore, the Fourth which is the Seer of all the three states and without a second. 5. As I am changeless the series producing pain viz., the body, the intellect and the senses are not Myself nor Mine. Moreover they are unreal like dream-objects, there being a reason for inference that they are so. —Adi Shankara, Upadeśasāhasrī 11.7

Advancing onwards, into the realm of secular philosophy, the same general concept as above can be found in many forms. Arthur Schopenhauer famously put forth the thesis of the world as merely a representation, a projection, of an underlying subject whose existence is presupposed by all things whatsoever, and which provides the foundation for multiplicity and cognition, itself being neither multiple nor cognized, not being within the field of space and time. To this subject, which transcends all objects and is not found among them, he gives the name of "Will."

“The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself. If any truth can be asserted a priori, it is this: for it is the expression of the most general form of all possible and thinkable experience: a form which is more general than time, or space, or causality, for they all presuppose it; and each of these, which we have seen to be just so many modes of the principle of sufficient reason, is valid only for a particular class of ideas; whereas the antithesis of object and subject is the common form of all these classes, is that form under which alone any idea of whatever kind it may be, abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is possible and thinkable. No truth therefore is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this, that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea. This is obviously true of the past and the future, as well as of the present, of what is farthest off, as of what is near; for it is true of time and space themselves, in which alone these distinctions arise. All that in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject, and exists only for the subject. The world is idea. —The World as Will and Representation, First Book

That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject. Thus it is the supporter of the world, that condition of all phenomena, of all objects which is always pre-supposed throughout experience; for all that exists, exists only for the subject. Every one finds himself to be subject, yet only in so far as he knows, not in so far as he is an object of knowledge. But his body is object, and therefore from this point of view we call it idea. For the body is an object among objects, and is conditioned by the laws of objects, although it is an immediate object. Like all objects of perception, it lies within the universal forms of knowledge, time and space, which are the conditions of multiplicity. The subject, on the contrary, which is always the knower, never the known, does not come under these forms, but is presupposed by them; it has therefore neither multiplicity nor its opposite unity. We never know it, but it is always the knower wherever there is knowledge. —The World as Will and Representation, First Book

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The following explanation, due to the nature of the concepts being tackled, will inevitably have to employ terms that (Although not false) bear diminutive connotations when used to refer to its subject matter. So as to not break the flow of the text and highlight the complete distinction between one and another, all such terms will be employed sous rature when needed, like so.

There are significant differences between all the above thinkers (A full exposition on them going far, far beyond the purposes of this article), and yet, it is possible to draw out a common notion which all of them expound: The foundational principle of reality as transcending all divisions and all separations, and by extension, all limitations and definitions. Under such lenses, then, the Absolute is not to be seen as a 'highest being' of any sort, but instead as transcending any hierarchy of beings entirely. And it is this rough outline that serves as the model for the highest tier, 0.

Since the idea of "transcending all distinctions, divisions, and multiplicity" has been introduced, it is necessary to define it more specifically. Though they're concepts too basic to be exactly defined, for our purposes, "distinction" and "multiplicity" can be thought of as the simple fact of something being "this thing, and not another." Henceforth, this can be referred to as simply "non-identity" (That is, the property of two things not being the same as each other), and what brings about non-identity is particularity and specificity.

To further qualify this, we then explain the ways in which particularity and specificity can occur. For instance, two physical objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time and must occupy different coordinates in the spacetime manifold. From here and onwards, two things that are distinct in this way may be referred to as "materially" or "physically" distinct.

Another potential pathway to differentiation is the logico-philosophical concept of Essence. That is: Its Intelligible "shape" that either expresses or sums up its intrinsic nature or definition. It is effectively the "whatness" of something: The essence of a horse sums up everything that entails being a horse, the essence of a table sums up everything that entails being a table, and so on and so forth. To say that two things, A and B, are distinct in that way is just to say that the question "What is it?" is not the same for A and for B. From here and onwards, two things that are distinct in essence may be referred to as "essentially" or "qualitatively" distinct.

From these two ways of differentiating something, it is obvious that the second type is broader. To clarify: It is possible for two things to be numerically different and yet qualitatively identical in some respect, as for example, two horses, but it is not possible to have qualitative distinction and numerical sameness, as non-identity in "whatness" requires at least two things, in order for one to not be what the other is, as contraries cannot coincide in the same subject. E.g. It is impossible to simultaneously be a horse, and something other than a horse.

Beyond this, we can also talk about individual, concrete essences, which beneath the mystical-sounding words, is to say: Not only all the distinctive features that characterize a general category of beings (e.g. Everything that distinguishes horses from beavers), but also a particular being taken together with all its distinctive features (i.e. This horse, and not that horse). These two things considered in conjunction, it is clear that essential non-identity always leads to numerical distinction. Indeed, essential distinctions encompass material distinctions.

As such, they lead to numerical distinction even when no material factors exist to distinguish between things to begin with. For instance, characters who are qualitatively superior to everything below them are obviously not materially distinguished from the things they transcend, and that much is tautological: A being that transcends space is not made distinct from spatial beings by space, as it does not exist in that framework to begin with. The only thing to distinguish them at that point is the nature of their existence; they are distinguished solely by essential differences.

From there, it becomes more plain that for something to have an essence in the strict sense is inherently for it to be some specific thing, and therefore for it to have demarcations and delimitations that mark if off as something separate from other things. That much is clear from the very etymology of the term "Definition," coming from the Latin "definire," meaning "to set bounds to," and from the general usage of the word itself in everyday life, as one says something is "well-defined," for example, to say that it has clear limits and boundaries. Thus, when "What a thing is" is expressed, one simultaneously and indirectly expresses what it is not, and the result of this is that any affirmation of essence whatsoever inherently denotes otherness and multiplicity. Further, it affirms a kind of multiplicity where the individuals comprising it mutually exclude each other. As such, this manner of distinction is the broadest one that remains relevant for this exposition.

If essence constitutes multiplicity and multiplicity constitutes essence, then, naturally, "To transcend all multiplicity" is convertible with "To transcend all essence." Consequently, a character of such a nature is a being that has no borders, no delimitations and no demarcations to its existence whatsoever. As it transcends particularity and specification, it transcends the whole notion of "This, not that" and "That, not this."

In broader terms, it might be possible to describe such a being as an "essence" in an analogical sense, due to the fact it exists at all, but the way in which it is an essence is very different in comparison to that which it transcends. A useful method of illustrating is by comparing the superiority that it holds over things with the superiority that lower tiers, such as 1-A, hold over lower things. That is:

A qualitatively superior domain is a higher level of existence, over and above the physicality and composition of a lesser reality, and the structure itself may be generalized into a multitude of "layers," in which each higher layer corresponds to a higher state that surpasses the lower. Here, there is an important sense in which each level is something specific and delimited, separated by the others by its very ontology. That is, while they are obviously not separated by space, the relation between all such layers is the relation of one object to another, and if one shifts between these levels, they have in a sense truly "changed locations," not by moving through actual spatial coordinates, but simply by being present to Realm B, as opposed to Realm A.

Not so, with a Tier 0. The nature of its transcendence results in it not being "somewhere else" compared to other things, in any sense whatsoever, insofar as that would entail an equivalent to "Being there, as opposed to here" and "Being here, as opposed to there." Since it transcends all such oppositions, it is also beyond any particular level of existence.

The crux of the matter here being that all of the aforementioned "levels" are able to be grouped together into a collection as its members. On the other hand, a Tier 0 does not stand to things as an object stands to another, but as a state that transcends objecthood entirely. More practically: In a cosmology where layers of reality are an ordered series of A, B and C, such a character is not "D", but rather the absence of the delineations distinguishing all of the aforementioned terms, and which would also distinguish an hypothetical "E", "F", "G", etc.

As such, it does not exist as a member of a collection alongside its inferiors, as if it was part of a multiplicity of objects. Similar to how the collection of all things within a cosmology is not, itself, something that can be put into a collection alongside one of its members (Such that the member and the set are the only elements of the new collection).

Thus, a Tier 0 not only utterly transcends 1-A, but also transcends even the distinction between 1-A and below-1-A, and furthermore also the distinction between 1-A and High 1-A, and between any conceivable levels of the latter tier as well. Moreover, whereas all such tiers have "inverse" versions of themselves (For instance, a 1-A finds its inverse in a 11-C character who is qualitatively inferior to conventional reality), Tier 0 can have no such counterpart, as it is too all-encompassing to have any sort of opposite lying outside of itself.

With all of that said, however, it is important to also make a few concessions: A verse might very well have a cosmology in which something perfectly fits with all of the aforementioned characteristics, but it does so not by transcending existing essences, but, rather, by being part of a cosmology in which the idea of "essence" itself is actually illusory and nonexistent, and only the Tier 0 of the setting actually exists. Such are verses taking inspiration from Buddhism, or perhaps even some rather specific forms of process philosophy. Ultimately, they are rated the same way as verses with cosmologies in more alignment with the above.

On Modality

As stated above, an omnipotent in this sense precedes and transcends essence and multiplicity, and so encompasses everything falling within such categories. Naturally, then, it is not constrained by any factors external to itself, and so if it is to act as the source and creator of reality (Which it might not), then, this activity is likewise completely unhindered by anything whatsoever.

Since there cannot be any multiplicity at all outside of that being's creative activity, this entails that the act in question must be a radical production leaving absolutely nothing out. Such a sourcing would constitute the creation not simply of particular objects, but also of essences themselves, whether those be reducible to such objects or not. Furthermore, essence, as definition, is the determiner of whether something is a possibility at all (e.g. A round square is an impossible object because "To be round" and "To be square" are mutually exclusive definitions), and therefore, in being the creator of essence, an omnipotent would also be the foundation of possibility itself.

That being the case, it is possible to say that it is prior to the modal category of possibility. That is not to say that it is necessarily an impossible or illogical object, however, as it is also coherent to think of it as grounding the framework of logic itself as its exemplar. If one were to use the language of the First as the "condition" for existence, this would mean that a given proposition only qualifies as a logical possibility if it meets this condition, and otherwise is an impossibility.

In fact, the disjunctive presupposition that either God chooses between possible alternatives or he is necessitated to create situates God within a total framework of possibilities, as though the logical conditions of possibility and impossibility were prior to and more universal than God, conditions to which even he is subject. This presupposition envisions God either as confronted with a multiplicity of logical possibilities among which he can choose, or as subject to a logical law such that there is only one possibility open to him. This is precisely the “ontic” conception of God that Plotinus, and Dionysius, are concerned to avoid by declaring him “beyond being.” God is not a being, subject, as are all beings, to the conditions of logical possibility such as the principle of non-contradiction. This is not to say that God can violate that principle; on the contrary, it would be more accurate to say that for the Neoplatonists, God or the One is the principle of non-contradiction. For what is that principle but the very condition of intelligibility and therefore of being? “To be is to be intelligible” means that to be is to conform to the laws of thought, which necessarily apprehends its object as determined by certain attributes and (therefore) as excluding the contradictory ones. The unity, the identity, and therefore the being of any thing consists in its conformity to this law. That law, therefore, is an expression of God as the unity, the identity, the being of beings. God is not a being, contained within a framework of possibilities determined by an abstract logic independent of himself. Rather, he is that framework within which all beings are contained, and hence he cannot be considered either as a being who chooses among a multiplicity of logical possibilities, or as a being confined by principles more universal than himself to a single possibility. —Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite

As a result: Absolutely nothing is prior to it. Nothing that it has comes, or can come, from something else. There is not, nor can there be, an explanatory principle more fundamental than it. This completely self-sufficient nature makes it closely aligned to the concept of "Necessary Being," which is to say: A being that simply is, and cannot be otherwise than it is.

With the advent of analytic theology, this concept naturally lent itself to be transformed into the idea that God, in short, exists in all possible worlds. This, however, is a very modern conception, and ultimately not something to be found in the original accounts of the concept, in which the "Necessity" of the First Principle is imputed simply on its unconditioned nature.

Indeed, the concept of God as "a being that exists in all possible worlds" is not without its critics on the side of Classical Theism. Edward Feser raises the objection that treating the Omnipotent this way implies that it is defined in terms of possible worlds, rather than the other way around, and is subject to possibilities rather than being the ground and source of possibility, both of which go against the conception of God as the most fundamental thing possible. Eric Perl, meanwhile, contests that to frame God-talk in terms of "possible worlds" is to presuppose that the conditions of possibility are already a given, and thus constitutes a failure to properly tackle the ground of being, which itself is both beyond being and the unconditioned condition for all being.

The situation becomes far more apparent when considering the already mentioned concept of Modal realism, which is the belief that possible worlds correspond to actually existing worlds existing apart from, and alongside, our own. In such a cosmology, possible worlds are determinate, specific, concrete things, and therefore the ground of being could not possibly exist "in" one such world, as it would then be part of a multiplicity, relative to other beings and, as such, able to be marked out within some list of items.

In that sense, this kind of necessary existence is not "existence in all possible worlds," but a consequence of the being's utter independence from all things. As it were, it is much more aptly described as providing the basis and precondition for logical possibility as a whole, and by extension, for possible worlds themselves.

How to Qualify

The above sections ought to have given the reader a good enough basis to understand the general concept and know what to look for, should they find a character that potentially qualifies for the rating. However, it also falls upon us to outline the basic set of conditions that a character must follow to truly qualify for it, in order to prevent potential misconceptions. That is:

Primacy

A Tier 0 cannot have anything above it, and nor can it have anything more fundamental than it. Consequently, it cannot be conditioned by anything other than its own nature (In other words, it cannot be conditioned at all).

As far as demonstration goes, it suffices to observe that "superiority" of the ordinary kind may come in a variety of ways. Firstly through physical and material things, such as mass and spacetime. Secondly, through natures and ontologies, or as it were essences, and this is the case with 1-A and above – To jump from one "level" of 1-A to another is, as it were, to shift from one essence (One ontological delimitation or set of such delimitations) to another.

Both are inapplicable to a Tier 0, as it transcends both physical multiplicity and ontological multiplicity. Since its "lack of differentiation" is not just internal, but also external, there can be nothing surpassing it, as that would imply there actually is differentiation above it, which is contradictory.

Unity

Bluntly speaking, there cannot be multiple Tier 0 beings. Since it transcends all ontological divisions, it is not coherent to conceive of many Tier 0s separately existing "alongside" each other, so that one doesn't, so to speak, touch the other. This would entail that each of the beings in question is differentiated from the others by something it has, and the others don't, and vice-versa, which contradicts the premise of the tier to begin with. Since it is already not "a" being, much less can there be many beings of that same tier.

There can, however, be distinction within Tier 0 if these distinctions don't introduce a variety of essences and substances in isolation and self-exclusion from each other. For example, if there are two characters A and B, and both are one and the same being/essence/substance, not being separate from each other even in their distinction. Bear in mind that such things must be stated to be the case, or at minimum have reasonable points of inference.

Immutability

A Tier 0 is utterly transcendent over any system of differences, divisions and inequalities. As such, it is not capable of change. Change is nothing but the progression from one state to another, which inherently signifies a division between the states in question (That is: Being in a certain state, at the exclusion of another). If a character is genuinely mutable, that means there exist divisions and inequalities in its level of existence, and therefore it is automatically disqualified from 0. Unless the change in question is somehow illusory, not reflecting anything in reality.

As a consequence, a character cannot "become" Tier 0 in the sense of filling up a spot that wasn't there before (In other words: "There wasn't any Absolute before. Now there is"). This condition does not admit of loopholes: "This character technically came to be at Point X, but afterwards it retroactively always existed" is not an admissible way to bypass it. Naturally, then, a Tier 0 cannot have come into existence in a sequence where it first does not exist, and then exists.

However, it is possible to "become" Tier 0 in cosmologies where all beings are simply identical to the already-existing Tier 0 at the core (Usually, due to any reality apart from it being ultimately illusory). In such cases, it would not be an ordinary apotheosis so much as a "shedding" of all individuating characteristics, and therefore a return to the source.

Furthermore, due to being immutable and beyond qualities such as time, causality and other orders of events, a Tier 0 cannot do things sequentially or in reaction to something. Since even something as simple as changing its mind or its mood would be a change, such things would disqualify one from being Tier 0. From the perspective of another character, its power may have effects at differing points in time, but for the Tier 0, all of those would have always been the case, as all possible events are created to happen as such from eternity.

Bear in mind, however, that a character merely being described as taking actions is not necessarily a disqualifier for Tier 0, so long as it's made clear by background context that it is not supposed to be literally performing sequential operations from its own perspective.

Indivisibility

Needless to say: Division in a Tier 0 is inadmissible. There is no such thing as a "fragment" of a Tier 0 in a literal sense, and neither is there such a thing as "Half the power of a Tier 0", or anything similar. It cannot be "broken down" into more basic component parts, and neither is it possible for multiple characters to fuse in a way that the product of their powers (Even if greater than the sum of its parts) yields a Tier 0

Furthermore: While lower tiers permit a division between a character's statistics and the nature of their existence (e.g. A character can have 1-A power but be physically 3-D), such a division is not possible in a Tier 0. However, a loophole of sorts is present if a character is, in some way, fully backed up by one. For example, if a character has the full favor of a Tier 0, who blesses and empowers them to be protected from all harm. Alternatively, a character could also be an avatar, or incarnation, of a Tier 0.

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To add to the above: Keep in mind that "oneness" in the context of a Tier 0 has a fairly specific meaning, which is transcendence over all differentiation and all particularity. A Tier 0 is not a blob of some mysterious energy, nor a pool of cosmic "stuff" in which all things are gathered and melted together. As such, statements of being "All-in-One," "Undifferentiated," "Indistinct," etcetera, are not automatic qualifiers without further context.

A useful illustration of this can be made by using the 1-A tier as a comparison: Take a character who is superior to all spatial things by being above space and devoid of it, which is to say it is beyond the differentiation between points in a mathematical structure. It is spatially undifferentiated, since it lacks any space to differentiate in the first place. On the other hand, a common notion in a variety of settings is the idea of the universe being created or shaped out of some indistinct "raw material" predating the ordering and structure of reality. Both are, in a sense, undifferentiated with regards to spacetime, but in very different ways, and most importantly: The former is 1-A, the latter, not necessarily so.

Thus, although a perfect reproduction of a specific philosophical account of the concept is not needed for something to qualify, it is still required that it follows the general basis of the concept: Ontop of reasonably clear indications of superiority, it should refer to a fundamental state/condition underlying reality and its divisions, in no way conditioned by it nor relative to it in any way. In this context, statements of transcendence over duality, opposition, polarity, etcetera, are of course well-received.

However, statements of omnipotence are obviously of no worth and will not grant anything in particular. Though they might be useful in order to amend certain things given the correct context.

Furthermore, a valid question that some may have is with regards to the status of apophatic theology in relation to the above. Broadly speaking, apophaticism is closely related to the mechanics of Tier 0, insofar as existing beyond all divisions and separations entails an inability to be circumscribed by any singular concept. And historically, the two concepts have also walked hand-in-hand in one way or another. However, in order to qualify for 0 through apophatics, these guidelines must be followed alongside the other conditions for the tier:

1. The incomprehensibility of the character must not come from a contingent limitation of a lower being's intellect, which could conceivably be overcome through some manner of evolution (e.g. The way a 4-dimensional hypercube is incomprehensible to our 3-dimensional brains), but from the fundamental nature of the character. To wit:

The first Lubavitcher rebbe, Schneur Zalman of Lyadi, makes it clear that the unknowability of Ein-Sof is not a function of the depth or difficulty of the concepts involved: "But it is not at all proper to say concerning the Holy One, blessed be He, who transcends intellect and wisdom, that it is impossible to apprehend Him because of the depth of the concept, for He is not within the realm of comprehension at all." According to Schneur Zalman, to say that one cannot comprehend Ein-Sof is akin to saying that one cannot literally touch an idea, "for the sense of touch refers and applies only to physical objects which may be grasped by the hands." Ein-Sof's wisdom is an order above thought, just as our thought is an order above the matter we apply it to; and just as inert matter cannot grasp our thoughts, we cannot fathom Ein-Sof's wisdom. —Symbols of the Kabbalah

2. The incomprehensibility in question, obviously, must be correlated to the "power" or "magnitude" of the character. It is perfectly possible for an object to be without any properties (For a strict definition of "property") and yet not be superior to these properties at all. See bare particulars for an example in philosophy. As such, something being stated to be "unknowable," "undefinable," and similar is not grounds for Tier 0 on its own.

3. The incomprehensibility in question must be due to the character fundamentally surpassing the very qualities that would serve as the object of intellection to begin with. Therefore, the statements must not be hyperbolic statements that only serve to underscore how mighty the character is, but must be serious statements on their ontology. Refer back to the quote provided above.

Do note, however, that this transcendent nature does not mean that there cannot be true statements about such a character, but only that it is beyond the ontological features signified by such predicates, inasmuch as said features exist in the framework of dualities and differences. In that vein, more exaggerated accounts are to be treated, as it were, as excess fat: They extend the concept into extremities that are perhaps rightly deemed absurd, but ultimately don't contradict the basic sufficient conditions for the tier.

Finally: As seen above, a number of terms in our everyday vocabulary are, strictly speaking, misnomers when applied to such characters. However, as most writers are human beings, it would be unreasonable to assume they are always speaking in strict philosophical terms when featuring these concepts in their works. As such, mere usage of inadequate verbiage does not automatically disqualify a character, though it might, of course, need justification or amendment by the background context of the character in question, depending on the severity of the inappropriateness.

Applications

Due to the very nature of their existence, Tier 0 characters technically have access to all powers and abilities displayed on this site. However, their extremely abstract nature guarantees that no given ability functions the same for a Tier 0 as it does for characters of any other tier. The following is a (Not necessarily exhaustive) overview of the basic set of abilities they are typically expected to have, as well as the mode in which they have them.

Note, also, that Tier 0s are not necessarily active beings or conscious minds. As such, any reference to activity and consciousness is with regards to characters that do display such characterization.

Supraessential Existence: As it transcends all divisions and inequalities that qualify any given object as "This, not that" or "That, not this," a Tier 0 has no borders or outlines that delimit its existence, and in being totally unlimited, it thus exists as no particular thing whatsoever. Consequently, it has no soul or mind, exemplifies no universal, has no information defining it, nor is subject to any other metaphysical aspect.

Beyond-Dimensional Existence: By nature, a Tier 0 does not exist in dimensional space, not being circumscribed by any sort of numerical coordinate, nor taking up any sort of volume. Neither, for the matter, is it in a higher "meta-space," inasmuch as this still entails some notion (However disanalogous) of being in a specific location, apart from somewhere else, and thus a constricting particularity which must be transcended. In the truest sense, it is nowhere at all.

Omnipresence: As it is not constrained to any particular, qualified, specific mode of existence, it is, in another respect, also everywhere, insofar as its being and presence necessarily can reach into any form of existence.

Acausality: The absolute transcendence of a Tier 0 entails that they are completely self-sufficient and independent, not conditioned to anything prior to itself and deriving no intrinsic fact of its own existence from anything other than itself. As such, they are uncaused and all of their actions are wholly self-willed. As noted, they also transcend the idea of a progression between different states, and are as such immutable, being beyond the duality of "Before" and "After."

Creation: As it is prior to all else, a Tier 0's mode of bringing things into existence is totally unconditioned and does not depend on any extrinsic factors. Whereas conventional "Creation from nothing" simply entails actualizing things that were already possible, it instead generates and determines possibility itself. And whereas other things simply create things inside a setting where plurality and distinction already exists, a Tier 0 creates these very things to begin with.

Since a Tier 0 is unbound by time and change, its creation of all things must not be seen as any kind of event. Since it generates multiplicity and duality itself, this act of creation occuring "From nothing" must not be pictured as an entity creating the universe inside some void of emptiness, either (As that would imply a pre-existent distinct thing "alongside" the Tier 0 itself and in independence from it). The being, as it were, would have created the void itself instead.

Omniscience: Though a Tier 0 is not necessarily a conscious being with agency, it nevertheless encompasses and expresses all possible information in itself. Therefore, if it is analogous to a mind, it, by necessity, must be omniscient.

Note, however, that this Omniscience may function similarly to Omnipotence itself. That is, a Tier 0 may "not know" some things, not because of any limitation in its knowledge, but because certain pieces of information are simply not truth-apt to begin with. For example, a Tier 0 may not have objective answers to moral questions (Even if it perfectly knows all possible answers to all such questions) because objective morality simply does not exist in the verse in question.

Immortality: As a corollary of its transcendence and immutability, a Tier 0 is utterly indestructible, and moreover, completely independent and autonomous.

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Due to the aforementioned factors, Tier 0 page formatting is quite different from that of lower-tiered profiles. In terms of Powers and Abilities, it should be structured as follows: "Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Omniscience (optional). Specific applications that have been demonstrated are: [Regular list of powers here]."

As for other statistics:

• Speed by default is set at Omnipresent
• Lifting Strength, Striking Strength and Stamina are set at Inapplicable
• Range is set at Boundless

Relevant Questions

Q: Can someone with access to all logical possibilities defeat a Tier 0?

A: There are two senses in which one may speak of possibility: a) Anything that is not inconsistent with a given set of conditions (e.g. The laws of logic). b) Something that doesn't necessarily exist, but could exist. The latter being more accurately described as "contingency," as seen above. A Tier 0 can be "possible" in the former sense, but not in the latter.

Anything that can be subjected to external power is, by definition, contingent in some way. As such, a character who has "power over all possibilities" in the sense of being able to actualize any of them is most accurately described as having power over all contingencies. In that sense, a Tier 0 is beyond all possibility and therefore not included within the domain of such a character's power. The answer, then, is no.

It is of interest to note, also, that the same principle applies to the Tier 0 itself: Any effects that it can actualize are infinitely transcended by its nature, precisely in being actualized and therefore contingent. Framing this argument in classical language: Anything that can go from non-actualization to actualization is subject to an underlying potentiality. A Tier 0 is above and beyond all potentiality, and therefore cannot be subject to such processes.

Q: Do I really need to adopt all that stuff whenever I set a verse to Tier 0?

A: Not at all. A verse does not need to create a perfect reproduction of any of the above accounts in order to qualify for the tier, as long as all of the sufficient conditions for it are met. The explanations above largely serve to give a demonstration of how Tier 0 works, and a default coherent explanation for how it would exist and interact with certain concepts. But a verse can adopt other views and even throw conventional logic out of the window as much as it likes, as long as it follows the basic concept given and the demands listed. Ultimately, the rating itself is a concept distilled to be independent from all its particular formulations in the history of philosophy.

Q: What happens if two Tier 0s fight?

A: Absurd notion.

Q: Does a Tier 0 transcend nonexistence as well?

A: The answer to this question, and whether the question itself has any meaning at all, depends on what is meant by "nonexistence." This might be given in three ways: a) A character or realm with some type of Nonexistent Physiology. b) Things that don't have any instances in actuality. c) Pure and simply "nothing at all."

The third variant ultimately makes the question into a meaningless one, as pure nonexistence, in this sense, is a notion with no intelligible content; it forms no true duality or opposition with anything, and therefore is not something to be "transcended" save in a trivial way (That is: Anything whatsoever is "beyond nonexistence" insofar as it is something, and not nothing).

The first and second variants elicit a Yes. The first, because such characters are not actual nothingness to begin with ("Actual nothingness," indeed, being an oxymoron), and strictly speaking are just odd forms of existence, which are ultimately particularized/specified/essentialized as regards their nature, and therefore fall under the scope of a Tier 0's transcendence.

The second, because even things that have no instances in actuality (e.g. Unicorns) ultimately still have a well-defined intelligible content to them; they have no reference, but nevertheless still have senses, and therefore are also surpassed by a Tier 0, in the same way a 1-A character, in exceeding dimensions and the framework of space, also exceeds even dimensional spaces that don't physically exist in their cosmologies. Such things, as it were, are not truly nothingness either, simply things that are possible as opposed to actual.

The takeaway from this, really, is that transcendence is always over things, or objects, whether existent or nonexistent. A Tier 0 transcends all objects, but it is not fundamentally different in that regard. A non-thing, such as "true nonexistence," nothingness on every level, is no object of transcendence, inasmuch as it has no content whatsoever to be conceived of as actualized in the first place.

Q: Is it a disqualifier for a would-be Tier 0 to be incapable of doing certain things?

A: Depends. For reasons already extensively discussed, a character being unable to accomplish contradictions is no impediment whatsoever to being Tier 0. In general, then, such things are only anti-feats if they imply a deficiency on the character's causal power, which is to say: There is some object or state-of-affairs X, existing in potentiality, that the character is incapable of bringing about. Contradictions are not such. However, if the verse does recognize contradictory objects as existing in potentiality, then that would indeed be a disqualifier.

See also

• Omniscience
• Omnipresence